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Abstract 
 
This paper formally examines the factors underlying how responsive imports must be to 
domestic prices (the ‘import supply elasticity’) in order to thwart an anticompetitive domestic 
price increase stemming from a merger––an issue that frequently arises in many antitrust 
reviews. Domestic firms face a fringe comprised of foreign firms who import their products into 
the domestic market.  In the eyes of domestic consumers, these imports are viewed as imperfect 
substitutes in demand to the output produced by the domestic firms.  The model is solved in 
terms of the ‘critical’ import supply elasticity that can then be used evaluate the ability of 
imports to constrain an anticompetitive price increase post-merger. Both general and linear 
demand specifications are considered. Numerical simulations are conducted to consider the 
magnitude of perturbations in the model’s exogenous parameters.  Potential empirical extensions 
of the model are also considered.      
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 1 Introduction 
 
 The influence that foreign imports may have on constraining the exercise of market 
power held by domestic firms – referred to as the ‘imports-as-market-discipline’ hypothesis – 
has interested industrial economists for some time.1   In recent years, the high industrial growth 
rates of several countries in Eastern Europe and the Far East have markedly increased the 
number of firms exporting into numerous domestic US markets, thereby potentially increasing 
the competitive pressure exerted by foreign suppliers even further.  Accordingly, the presence 
and potential entry (or expansion) of foreign competitors in the domestic market may play an 
important role in the investigation by the antitrust authorities of proposed mergers between 
competing domestic firms.           
 The question of whether foreign firms should be viewed as constraining price increases 
by domestic firms has been a central issue in recent, high-profile antitrust cases.  For example, 
the US Department of Justice (DOJ), in its approval of the controversial merger between 
Whirlpool and Maytag in 2006, found that the transaction was unlikely to reduce competition 
substantially in part because “…newer brands such as LG and Samsung have quickly established 
themselves in recent years.  LG, Samsung, and other foreign manufacturers could increase their 
imports into the U.S.”2   According to the DOJ, these foreign manufacturers of household 
appliances could export sufficient quantities of product into the US to offset any incentive of a 
combined Whirlpool-Maytag to decrease its output and raise domestic prices.3  The DOJ 
                                                 
1 Theoretical treatments include Jacquemin et al. (1980), Lyons (1980), Pugel (1980), Huveneers (1981), and 
Kwoka (1998).  Studies that (also) empirically test the hypothesis include Jacquemin et al. (1980), Pugel (1980), de 
Melo & Urata (1986), De Ghellinck (1988), Clark et al. (1990), Levinsohn (1993), Feinberg & Shaanan (1994), 
Katics & Petersen (1994), Hansson (1992), Field & Pagoulatos (1998), Min (1999), Thompson (2002), and Ghosal 
(2002).    
2US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, STATEMENT ON THE CLOSING OF ITS INVESTIGATION OF WHIRLPOOL'S 
ACQUISITION OF MAYTAG (March 29, 2006), available at 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.htm>. 
3 See id. (“The investigation revealed that a number of manufacturers, such as LG and Samsung, currently 
manufacture overseas high-efficiency, front-load washers and dryers and sell them successfully in the U.S. … 
companies such as LG currently manufacture top-load washers in Asia, and Samsung already manufactures top-load 
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 effectively concluded that LG, Samsung, and other foreign manufactures could defeat a ‘small 
but significant and non-transitory increase in price’ (referred to as a ‘SSNIP’) imposed post-
merger by Whirlpool-Maytag.       
 The DOJ’s conjecture that foreign imports would constrain pricing by Whirlpool-Maytag 
has been criticized by some analysts.  Baker & Shapiro (2008) argue that the recent, low-scale 
entry of foreign suppliers, such as LG and Samsung, into a mature market in which brand name 
is important does little to quell concerns that the transaction would not have any adverse effects 
on consumers.  Baker & Shapiro consider two (arguably interrelated) questions: (1) would LG, 
Samsung, or other foreign manufacturers have the capacity and brand reputation to attract the 
business of large retail distributors; and (2) would domestic consumers whose first and second 
choices are Whirlpool and Maytag products view foreign products as ‘sufficiently’ close 
substitutes?    
If the answers to the above questions are both ‘no,’ then the foreign appliance 
manufacturers would not be able to constrain a post-merger price increase.   In this case, even a 
relatively large post-merger price increase imposed by the domestic hypothetical monopolist 
(merged firms) would not lead to a substantive increase in the amount of import quantities 
brought into the domestic market, thereby mitigating the extent to which foreign suppliers may 
constrain the post-merger exercise of market power by the merged firm.  
 From an antitrust analysis perspective, the question of whether the ‘imports-as-market-
discipline” hypothesis holds hinges on whether the ‘import supply elasticity’ – which measures 
the responsiveness of foreign imports to changes in domestic prices – is sufficiently large to 
offset any post-merger exercise of market power by merging domestic firms.  We investigate this 
                                                                                                                                                             
washers in Mexico for sale in Latin America. Thus, any attempt by the merged entity to raise prices in the sale of 
conventional top-load washers likely would be checked by … the threat that top-load washers made in Mexico or 
overseas could be sold into the United States, and the loss of sales to suppliers of front-load washing machines.”).  
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 issue analytically by drawing in part from the critical loss literature.4  Critical loss has been used 
as a method for defining relevant antitrust product and geographic markets in a number of 
merger cases, but to date has not been fully considered in the context of whether foreign firms 
may constitute important competitive checks in domestic markets. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the general theoretical model based 
upon Huveneers (1981) in which domestic firms compete non-cooperatively in homogenous 
products à la Cournot and face a fringe of foreign firms who import into the domestic market.  
Imports are viewed in the eyes of domestic consumers as imperfect substitutes (i.e., to varying 
degrees) to the output produced by domestic firms.  We analytically derive an expression for the 
equilibrium domestic industry-wide price-cost margin (Lerner Index) and show how this markup 
relates to the import supply elasticity.  We then consider how the components of this elasticity 
affect its magnitude.5    
In Section 3 we examine a hypothetical merger in the context of the above model and an 
expression for the critical import supply elasticity – i.e., the minimum value of the elasticity that 
would prevent a hypothetical domestic monopolist from unilaterally imposing a SSNIP post-
merger.  We explore how the critical import supply elasticity affects the magnitude of a relative 
price increase resulting from a change in the domestic market structure toward increased 
concentration resulting from a merger.  The expression for the critical import supply elasticity in 
turn provides a formal test for determining the impact of foreign competitors that can be readily 
applied by the antitrust enforcement agencies.  We also discuss the key determinants of the 
critical import supply elasticity and consider the implications of perturbing these factors.          
                                                 
4 See, inter alia, Harris & Simons (1989), Danger & Frech (2001), Langefeld & Li (2001), Katz & Shapiro (2003), 
O’Brien & Wickelgren (2003), Bauman & Godek (2006), Strand (2006), Weisman (2006), Baker (2007), and Coate 
& Williams (2007).  
5 The model developed herein could also be applied in cases that do not explicitly involve issues of international 
trade and foreign competition.  For instance, it might be used to examine cases where a dominant firm facing a 
competitive fringe has used practices to abuse its dominant position and maintain market power.   
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  Section 4 then presents a linear version of the model in which the critical import supply 
elasticity is derived.  We show that that the comparative statics results from the general model 
also hold in the parameterized model.  Section 5 offers some numerical simulations of the model 
in order to further gauge the magnitude of the relationship between the critical import supply 
elasticity and key model parameters.  Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks and discusses 
the application of the formal analysis considered here to future empirical work.   
 
2 Price-cost margins and the import supply elasticity 
 We consider a model of competition in which domestic firms compete non-cooperatively 
in homogenous products and play Cournot strategies.  The domestic firms also face a fringe 
comprised of foreign firms who import their products into the domestic market.   These imports, 
from the perspective of domestic consumers, are imperfect substitutes in demand to the output 
produced by domestic firms.6       
    We assume that there are n  domestic firms indexed by i .  Let  denote the output of 
home firm i .  The inverse demand curve for home output is given by  
ihq
  (1) ( , )h hP f q M=
where 
  (2) h iq = å ihq
and M  is the quantity of output imported by the competitive fringe.  This inverse demand curve 
is decreasing in both home output and imports so that, 
 0 and 0
h
f
q M
¶ <¶ ¶
f¶ <
                                                
. (3) 
The demand and supply curves for imports are given by 
 
6 The basic model presented herein is derived from Huveneers (1981) and is an extension of the dominant firm-
competitive fringe model from Stigler (1940).   
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   (4) ( ,f h fM Q P P= )
)
and 
 , (5) (f fM S P=
respectively, where  is the price of imports.  The substitutability, albeit imperfect, between 
home output and imports implies 
fP
 0, 0, 0, 0f fh h
h f h f
Q QQ Q
P P P P
¶ ¶¶ ¶< > >¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ <
)
, (6) 
where  is the inverse of .( ,h h fQ P P ( , )hf q M 7 
 The profit-maximization problem of home firm i  is given by 
 , for all , (7) max ( , ) ( )
ih
ih h ih ih ih
q
f q M q C qP = - i
where  is firm ’s total cost function .  Firm i  produces its output with 
constant marginal cost  and fixed cost .  The first-order condition associated with this 
maximization problem is given by 
( )ih ih ih ih ihC q c q F= +
ihc
i
ihF
 1 0f f fih h ih ih
ih h f h ih
Q Q Pf f
P q c
q M P P P q
éæ ì üö ù¶ ¶ ¶¶P ¶ ¶ï ïï ï÷çê ú= + + + - =÷í ýç ÷çê úï ï¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶è øï ïë î þ û
, for all . (8) i
Equilibrium in the import market implies, 
 
f
f h
f fh
f f
Q
dP P
dS QdP
dP P
¶
¶= ¶- ¶
. (9) 
                                                 
d
7 The model implicitly subsumes the myriad sources of potential product differentiation between home and imported 
output.  For instance, one might consider  where d  denotes distance and t  the transportation cost.  
Thus, firms located in countries farther away from the home market would charge higher prices relative to firms 
located in closer countries.  Clearly, in this case distance becomes the primary driver of product differentiation.  The 
present model is more general in the sense that any source of potential product differentiation between foreign and 
home output may be considered, including brand name effects, service quality, the extent of the sales force or 
number of manufacturing plants located in the home market, etc.  
f hP P t= +
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 Rearranging equation (8) and making use of equation (9) yields the following firm-
specific price-cost margin (i.e., the Lerner index) 
 1
1
hf fhh ih ih
fh h
f
P c s
P
e e
hh
s
é ùê ú- ê ú= +ê úê ú-ê úë û
, for all i , (10) 
where  
firm  share of home output : ' (ihih
h
q
s i s
q
= > 0) ;
the (absolute) own-price elasticity of demand for home output ;: (h hh
h h
Q P
P q
h ¶= - >¶ 0)
the cross-price elasticity of import  w.r.t the price of home output : (f hfh
h
Q P
demand
P M
e ¶= >¶ 0);
the elasticity of the price for home output w.r.t import  ;: (hf
h
f M
demand
M P
e ¶= <¶ 0)  
the own-price elasticity of import  ;: (f ff
f
Q P
demand
P M
h ¶= <¶ 0)  
the own-price elasticity of import  supply: (f ff
f
dS P
dP M
s = > 0).         
 
Multiplying both sides of equation (10) by firm i ’s market share  and then summing over the 
home firms yields the industry-wide Lerner index, 
ihs
 1 hf fh fh h h
h h f
P c HHI
P
e e s
h s
æ ö- ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç -è øfh
h ihs ih
                                                
 (11) 
where  is the share-weighted industry marginal cost and  where 
 is the sum of squared market shares, both defined with respect to domestic firms 
and their output levels. 
h ii
c c= å
(0,1]Î
2
h i
HHI s= å
hHHI
 Turner (1980, p. 155) notes that “it is the elasticity of import supply with respect to 
changes in domestic prices that constrains the prices domestic producers may set” (emphasis 
added).8  This elasticity, in the context of the present model, is given by Definition 1. 
 
8 Some studies have used the import share of total domestic sales as a proxy for the constraint that foreign firms 
impart on domestic producers.  Turner (1980), however, shows that a high import share is a sufficient, but not 
necessary, condition for the ‘imports-as-market-discipline’ hypothesis to hold.  As such, our analysis is focused on 
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 Definition 1.  The cross-price elasticity of import supply with respect to the price for 
domestic output (‘import supply elasticity’) is, 
 
                      ( , , ) 0f fh fhS S fh f f
h f f
dS P
dP M
e sx x e s h s hº = = - >
                                                                                                                                                            
. (12) 
Therefore, given estimates of , , and , one could estimate the import supply elasticity.  
Under the assumption that these other elasticities are exogenous, a few observations are worth 
noting. 
fhe fs fh
Observation 1.  The import supply elasticity is increasing in , all else equal. fhe
The size of  reflects the degree to which consumers would be willing to substitute 
towards imports in response to a price increase for home output.  If  is relatively small in 
magnitude, then consumers do not perceive imports and home output to be close substitutes.  
This effect would, of course, endogenously impact the magnitude of , which would be smaller 
for lower values of .  That is, foreign firms recognize that consumers will not increase their 
consumption of imports very much even if the relative price of home output rises.  This lowers 
the extent to which they would be willing to provide imports to the home market even if the 
relative price of home output rises. 
fhe
fhe
fhe
Sx
Observation 2.   The import supply elasticity is increasing in , all else equal. fs
 Foreign firms can choose to supply the foreign market or the home market.  An increase 
in the relative price of home output makes the home market more attractive to foreign firms 
relative to the foreign market.  Therefore, in response to a relative price increase for home output 
we would expect foreign firms to shift their production away from the foreign market to the 
home market.  The size of this shift depends on how responsive foreign firms are to changes in 
 
the cross-price elasticity of import supply with respect to the price for domestic output because this elasticity is more 
likely to reflect the economic effect of interest in conducting an antitrust merger review.   
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 the import price.  The more sensitive foreign firms are to changes in the import price (i.e. the 
greater is ), the greater will be the shift to the home market in response to an increase in the 
relative price of home output.  As a result, the import supply elasticity is increasing in the own-
price elasticity of import supply. 
fs
Observation 3.  The import supply elasticity is decreasing in the absolute value of , all else 
equal. 
fh
 
 An increase in fh  suggests that consumers are more sensitive to changes in the price of 
imports.  Therefore a small increase in the relative price of home output, which is equivalent to a 
decrease in the price of imports, will lead to large changes in demand for imports.  As a 
consequence, foreign firms will find it more profitable to import in response to a relative price 
increase for home output. 
 
3 The import supply elasticity and the competitive significance of foreign firms 
We turn now to the relationship between the import supply elasticity and the ability for a 
merged firm to impose a SSNIP.  Specifically, we seek to determine how large the import supply 
elasticity must be so that foreign firms limit the post-merger ability of home firms to impose a 
unilateral or coordinated anticompetitive price increase. 
Let  denote the value of  that implicitly solves the  first-order conditions from 
equation (8).  Substituting equation 
0P hP n
(12) into equation (11) and solving for  yields 0P
 0 (1 )
h h
h h hf
c
P
HHI
h
h e= - + Sx . (13) 
The denominator in equation (13) must be strictly positive in order to ensure that  is strictly 
positive.  It is worth noting that  is decreasing in the import supply elasticity––the more 
0P
0P
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 responsive foreign firms are to changes in the price of home output, the lower is the price of 
home output.  This effect demonstrates the ‘imports-as-market-discipline’ hypothesis. 
 Now consider a merger by a subset m  of the home firms.  If we assume that:  (1) the 
various elasticities in equation (13) are constant, at least in the short run; (2) that the post-merger 
price for home output is strictly positive and; (3) that the post-merger industry marginal cost 
does not change, then the post-merger price, P , must exceed the pre-merger price, .¢ 0P 9 
Lemma 1.  The relative post-merger price change is, 
 
 
( )
( )
0
0
1
1
hf S h
h h hf
P P
P n HHI
e x
e x
¢ + D- = ¢- + S
h
, (14) 
 
where measures the post-merger level of concentration in the market for home output and 
 is the change in concentration in the market for home output due to the 
merger. 
hHHI ¢
h hHHI ¢ HHID = -
 
Proof:   ( )1
h h
h h hf
c
P
HHI
h
h e S
¢ = ¢- + x ( ) and 0 1
h h
h h hf
c
P
HHI
h
h e= - + Sx  imply 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) (( )
( ) ( )
)
( )
( ) ( )
0 11
1 1
( 1 )( 1
1 ( )
( 1 )( 1 )
1
h h h h
h h hf Sh h hf S
h h h h hf S h h hf S
h h hf S h h hf S
h h hf S h h
h h hf S h h hf S
h h
c c
P P
HHIHHI
c HHI HHI
HHI HHI
c HHI HHI
HHI HHI
c
h h
h eh e x
h h e x h e x
h e x h e x
h e x
h e x h e x
h
æ ö æ ö÷ç ÷÷ çç¢ - = - ÷÷ çç ÷÷ ÷çç - +è ø÷¢ç - +è ø
¢- + - + +
= ¢- + - +
¢+ -= ¢- + - +
= ( )( ) ( )
)
x
.
( 1 )( 1 )
hf S h
h h hf S h h hf SHHI HHI
e x
h e x h e x
+ D
¢- + - +
 (15) 
   
Then, 
                                                 
9 The assumption that industry marginal cost does not change post-merger is equivalent to assuming that there are no 
cost efficiencies arising from the merger.  The motivation for merger in this case would be strictly to enhance 
market power.  Primes, here and elsewhere, are used to denote post-merger values. 
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
0
0
1
( 1 )( 1 )
1
1 1
( 1 )( 1 )
1
.
1
h h hf S h
h h hf S h h hf S
h h
h h hf S
h h hf S h h h hf S
h hh h hf S h h hf S
hf S h
h h hf S
P P
P
c
HHI HHI
c
HHI
c HHI
cHHI HHI
n HHI
h e x
h e x h e x
h
h e x
h e x h e
hh e x h e x
e x
e x
¢ -
æ ö+ D ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ¢ ÷ç - + - +è ø= æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷÷ç - +è ø
+ D - += ⋅¢- + - +
+ D= ¢- +
x
 (16) 
Q.E.D. 
Let  denote the exogenous set of home and import 
own- and cross-price elasticities and other model parameters.  Similar to Bauman and Godek 
(2006) and Weisman (2007), we define the critical value of  as follows. 
{ , , , , , }h hf h h hn HHI c SSNIPe ¢º DX
Sx
Definition 2.  The critical value of  is given by, Sx
 
 0*
0
min : | ,S S
P P
SSNIP
P
x x ¢ì ü-ï= £íïï ïî þ
Xïýï  (17) 
 
where .  That is, the ‘critical import supply elasticity’ is the value of  that is just 
high enough such that the post-merger price for home output would not increase price by SSNIP- 
percent or more. 
(0,1)SSNIP Sx
 
Proposition 1.  The critical value of  is, Sx
 
 
( )
( )*
h h
S
h h
HHI SSNIP
HHI SSNIP
h
x
e
¢- -
= ¢D +
h
hf
D
hx D
. (18) 
 
Proof:  By Definition 2 and Lemma 1, the critical import supply elasticity satisfies the condition, 
 
( )( ) ( )* *1 1h h hf S hf SHHI SSNIPh e x e¢- + ³ + . 
 
Collecting the  terms in the above expression gives, *Sx
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( ) ( )
( )
( )
*
* .
h h h h h h
h h h
S
h h hf
HHI SSNIP HHI SSNIP
HHI SSNIP
HHI SSNIP
h e
h
x
e
¢ ¢- -D ³ D +
¢- -D
 ³ ¢D +
f Sx
 
   
Evaluating the above expression at equality yields the result. 
Q.E.D. 
 
 In order for the critical import supply elasticity to be strictly positive (unlike the general 
import supply elasticity in equation (12) that is positive by definition), we require, 
 whenh h
h h
SSNIP HHI
HHI
h
h
D ¢< ¢- h
>
)
                                                
. (19) 
By Definition 2, the import supply elasticity ( ) must be at least as great as some critical value 
( ) in order for a SSNIP to be defeated.  Therefore, any time the inequality in equation (19) is 
violated the critical import supply elasticity is negative and a SSNIP is always defeated.  This 
suggests that when demand for home output is ‘sufficiently’ elastic with respect to own-price a 
relatively large SSNIP (i.e., ) will always be defeated.  Therefore, 
the critical import supply elasticity is binding when home demand is relatively elastic with 
respect to own-price and the SSNIP is relatively small (i.e., the inequality in equation (19) is 
satisfied).
Sx
h hh
*
Sx
(/ hSSNIP HHI ¢> D -
10 
Observation 4.  The critical import supply elasticity is decreasing in the own-price elasticity 
of demand for home output ( ).  hh
 
Observation 4 simply demonstrates that the more responsive consumers are to a change 
in the price of home output, the lower is the value of the import supply elasticity that is needed in 
order for foreign competitors to constrain a domestic price increase. 
 
10 For completeness, the critical import supply elasticity is also binding whenever demand for home output is 
inelastic with respect to own-price (i.e., ). h hHHIh ¢<
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 Observation 5.  The critical import supply elasticity is increasing in the change in the HHI 
( ). hD
 
Observation 6.  The critical import supply elasticity is increasing in the post-merger level of 
concentration ( ). hHHI ¢
 
Taken together, Observations 5 and 6 indicate that the more concentrated the market for 
home output becomes post-merger, both in terms of the absolute level of concentration and in 
terms of the change in concentration, the larger the import supply elasticity must be in order for 
foreign firms to defeat a SSNIP post-merger. 
Observation 7.  The critical import supply elasticity is decreasing in the SSNIP. 
 
All else equal, the larger the post-merger SSNIP, then the larger is the increase in the 
relative price of home output.  The substitutability between home and foreign output results in 
higher consumption of imports the larger is the SSNIP.  As a result, foreign firms do not need to 
be as responsive to changes in the price of home output in order for the SSNIP to be defeated. 
Observation 8.  If the critical import supply elasticity binding, then it is also decreasing in 
the elasticity of the price for home output w.r.t. import demand ( ). hfe
 
A critical import supply elasticity which is strictly positive implies that the partial 
derivative of   with respect to  is strictly negative.  If the price for home output is more 
sensitive to changes in import demand, then the change in import demand due to the relative 
price increase for home output post-merger will constrain somewhat the merged firm’s ability to 
impose a SSNIP.  As a consequence, foreign firms do not need to be as responsive to changes in 
the price of home output in order to defeat a SSNIP. 
*
Sx hfe
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 4 The case of linear demand 
 We now assume that there are just two domestic firms indexed byi  and that the inverse 
demand curve for home output is given by, 
 , (20) ( ),h h hP f q M q Ma g= = - -
where 0  is the degree of substitution between home output and imports and 
.  As  approaches zero the home output and imports become unrelated and as 
 approaches one home output and imports become perfect substitutes.  In addition, we also 
assume that the demand and supply curves for imports are given by, 
1g< <
1 2h h hq= +q q
g
g
 ( ) ( ) 21, 1
h
f h f
P P
M Q P P
g a g
g
- + -= = -
f
a-
 (21) 
and 
 , (22) ( )f f fM S P P= =
respectively. 
Lemma 2.  The linear demand assumptions in equations (25) - (27) yield the following set of 
derivatives: 
 
 
2
2 2
1, , ,
1
1
, 1, .
1 2
f
ih h h
f f f
f f h
Qf f f
q q M P
Q dS dP
P dP dP
gg g
g
g g
¶¶ ¶ ¶= = - = - =¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ -
¶ = - = =¶ - -
 
 
 
Proof.  All of the derivatives, with the exception of f
h
dP
dP
, follow directly from differentiation of 
equations  (20)-(22).  Substituting the relevant derivatives into equation (9) yields the result for 
f
h
dP
dP
.           
Q.E.D. 
Using equation (8) and Lemma 2 we have, 
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  ( ) ( ){ } ( )21 1 12h ih ihP q cgg g g 0éæ ö÷ç+ + - - + - - - =ê ú÷ç ÷çè ø ùê ú-ë û . (23) 
Rearranging equation (23) and dividing both sides by  yields the firm-specific Lerner index, hP
 
( )2
2
2 1
2
h ih i
h h
P c q
P
g
g
-- = -
h
P
 (24) 
Solving equations (20)-(22) and equation (24) simultaneously for , , , and M  yields, hP ihq fP
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )22 2
4 2
1 2 2
6 6
h
h
a c
P
g g a g g
g g
- - + + -= - + , (25) 
 
( ) ( )(
( )
)2
4 2
2 2 2
2 6 6
h
ih
a c
q
g g a g
g g
- - + -= - + , (26) 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )2 4 2 2
4 2
1 3 4 3 2
6 6
h
f
a
P
g g g a g g g g
g g
- + - + - + + -= - +
c
)
, (27) 
 
( )( ) ( ) (2 2
4 2
1 3 3 2 2
6 6
ha cM
g g g a g g g
g g
- + - - - + -= - +
2
. (28) 
In order for  and M  to be non-negative, we require, ihq
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )(
2 2
2
3 2 1 3 1
2
22 h
a
c a
g g g g a g a gg g
- - - + - £ £ - +- ) , (29) 
and . aa ³
Lemma 3.  Under the linear demand assumptions of equations (20)-(22), the absolute own-
price elasticity of demand for home output ( ) is, hh
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
22 2
2
1 2 2
2 2 2
h
h
h
a
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g g a g gh g g a g
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c
)
, (30) 
 
and the elasticity of the price for home output w.r.t. import demand ( ) is, hfe
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h
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h
a
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2
2
c
. (31) 
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 Proof.  From equation (10), the absolute own-price elasticity of demand for home output is, 
 
 h hh
h h
Q P
P q
h ¶= - ¶ , 
 
and the elasticity of the price for home output w.r.t. import demand is, 
 
 hf
h
f M
M P
e ¶= ¶ . 
Taking note of the fact that, 
 
 1h
h
h
Q
fP
q
¶ = ¶æ¶ ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø¶
ö , (32) 
 
implies, 
 
 
h
h
h
h
P
q
f
q
h
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø= - ¶æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø¶
. (33) 
 
Substituting the values of  and  from equations hP ihq (25) and (26) and the value of  
h
f
q
¶
¶  from 
Lemma 2 into equation (30) yields the result for .  Similarly, substituting the values of  
andM  from equations 
hh hP
(25) and (28) and the value of f
M
¶
¶  from Lemma 2 into the expression for 
 yields the result for the elasticity of the price of home output w.r.t. import demand. hfe
          Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2.  Under the linear demand assumptions of equations (20)-(22), if the two home 
firms merge to form a monopoly, then the critical import elasticity is, 
 
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( )( )
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( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
2 2
2 2 22
*
2
2
2 2
1 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 42
1 32
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hh
S
h h
a a SSNIP
SSNIP cc
SSNIP
a c a c
g g a g g a g g
g ggx g g g ag a
g g g g g g
æ öæ ö- - + - + + -÷ç ÷ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷- - + -çç+ - ÷è øè ø= æ ö- + --æ ö ÷ç÷ç ÷ç÷ç- + ÷ç÷ç ÷÷ç+ -ç ÷- - + -çè øè ø
. (34) 
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 Proof.  In the case where the two home firms merge to form a monopoly,  and 1hHHI ¢ =
1
2h
D = .  Substituting these values, along with the values of  and  from Lemma 3, into 
equation (18) from Proposition 1 yields the result.     
hh hfe
Q.E.D. 
Substituting the relevant values of  and  into equation (19) we require, hHHI ¢ hD
 ( ) when
1
1
2 1 hh
SSNIP hh< - >
                                                
, (35) 
in order for the critical elasticity in equation (39) to be strictly positive and, therefore, binding.   
Observation 9.  Under the linear demand assumptions of equations (20)-(22), the critical 
import elasticity is decreasing in the SSNIP. 
 
 Proposition 9 is consistent with the findings of Observation 7 for the general case.  The 
critical import elasticity is binding when the demand for home output is elastic with respect to 
own-price.  This means that as the SSNIP increases the diversion from home output, due to either 
not purchasing at all or to purchasing imports, will increase.  Therefore, foreign firms do not 
need to be as responsive to the SSNIP in order for it to be defeated because this is being 
accomplished, to a greater extent, through the decrease in the consumption of home output. 
 
5 Critical import supply elasticity simulations 
 This section presents numerical simulations of changes in the critical import supply 
elasticity, , as effectuated by perturbations in key model parameters relating to the 
substitutability of domestic and foreign output.  All simulations are conducted for the general 
case.
*
Sx
11  Figure 1(a) graphs  (given by equation (18)) as a function of  (which reflects the 
degree to which domestic consumers view the domestic good and imports as substitutes in 
*
Sx hfe
 
11 Simulations pertaining to the linear case are qualitatively similar and available upon request.   
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 consumption) at following parameter values: { 1 ; ; ; 
.   
.0 0.18hHHI ¢ =
hfe
hh = 0.5hD =
hf
10hh =
0.05}SSNIP =
hfe
The critical import supply elasticity is shown to be a decreasing and convex in .  This 
result is intuitive: as the domestic price becomes more sensitive to an increase in the quantity of 
foreign imports (i.e., as  becomes large in absolute value), the minimum value of   required 
to defeat a five percent SSNIP (at the given parameter values) falls.  As e  approaches zero  
approaches infinity; accordingly, it would take ‘infinitely large’ import supply elasticity to offset 
any given SSNIP when consumers do not view domestic and foreign products are substitutes.  
Conversely, when the effective degree of substitution approaches infinity, the critical import 
elasticity approaches zero (although at a decreasing rate).  
hfe
*
Sxhfe
*
Sx
 Figure 1(b) graphs the import supply elasticity frontier assuming  (indicating 
that the demand for domestic output becomes more own-price elastic) but holding all other 
parameter values at the same levels as before.  The frontier exhibits the same general shape as 
Figure 1(a), but has shifted downward for every value of .  This result is also economically 
intuitive.  As domestic consumers become more price sensitive to the price of domestically 
produced output, a lower value of   is needed to defeat a given SSNIP at any given value of 
.   
*
Sx
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 Foreign imports may be an important competitive check on the exercise of market power 
by domestic firms.  Whether this is the case depends on how willing domestic consumers are to 
substitute foreign products for domestic ones, which in turn endogenously determines the extent 
to which foreign firms will export products in response to a domestic price increase.  In this 
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 paper we analytically derive an expression for this ‘critical import supply elasticity,’ which can 
be used to analyze the ability of foreign firms to constrain domestic price increases.  If the value 
of this critical elasticity is ‘sufficiently low,’ then foreign production locations should be counted 
in the relevant (global) geographic market (and vice versa).   
Our analysis demonstrates how, in the general case, the critical import supply elasticity is 
related to the domestic market structure as well as changes to that market structure (such as from 
a merger, for example), the own-price elasticity of domestic output, the extent to which domestic 
consumers are willing to substitute between foreign- and domestic-produced goods, and the 
magnitude of a hypothetical price increase effectuated by a merger.  The impact of changes in 
each of these factors on the magnitude of the import supply elasticity, which determine whether 
the ‘imports-as-market-discipline’ hypothesis will tend to hold, are also considered.  We also 
derive closed-form expressions for the critical import supply elasticity (and other parameters) in 
a model that relies upon linear demand functions for foreign and domestic goods.      
 Ultimately, implementing a competitive effects analysis requires some degree of 
empirical evidence (or at least casual observation to draw inferences).  Our model highlights 
those data and estimation strategies that are likely to be required in order to appropriately 
conduct such an exercise when considering domestic markets facing the presence of foreign 
competition.  Empirically determining the critical import supply elasticity requires obtaining 
estimates of the own-price elasticity of domestic demand and the other structural and behavioral 
parameters that define the expression.  In addition, the inherent endogeneity underlying any 
structural model of import supply/demand will require the adoption of appropriate econometric 
techniques to separately identify demand and supply effects.   
 However, to date relatively few empirical studies have attempted to estimate export 
supply elasticities while carefully addressing endogeneity issues.  Goldstein & Kahn (1978) 
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 estimate both export demand and supply elasticities.  Carey (1997) modifies the Goldstein & 
Kahn empirical framework to estimate import supply and demand elasticities via instrumental 
variables methods.  Neither analysis, however, is concerned with conducting a competitive 
effects analysis through estimation of critical import supply elasticity as considered here.  
Extending the empirical methodologies used in these studies to estimate critical import supply 
elasticities should be a fruitful and useful endeavor for future empirical work and antitrust 
analyses of mergers involving foreign competition.          
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FIGURE 1: GENERAL CRITICAL IMPORT SUPPLY ELASTICITY FRONTIER  
{ 0hHHI ¢ = .18 0.5hD =; ;  0.05}SSNIP =
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